Should New Zealand Be Looking More Closely at Former IDF Soldiers Entering the Country?

New Zealand already accepts a simple principle.

Some visa applicants deserve closer scrutiny than others.

That is not a controversial proposition. Immigration New Zealand’s character instructions already recognise that applicants who have been associated with military organisations implicated in war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross human rights abuses may require additional assessment before they are granted entry to New Zealand. Importantly, those instructions are directed at the individual’s own conduct, not their nationality or military service alone. 

So why has this issue suddenly become relevant in relation to Israel?

The answer lies in what has happened over the past two years.

Military operations in Gaza have become the subject of unprecedented international scrutiny. The International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, United Nations investigative bodies and major international human rights organisations have all produced reports, commenced proceedings or published findings concerning alleged violations of international humanitarian law. Those developments have created a body of international material that simply did not exist before October 2023.

Whether those allegations are ultimately proven is not the point of this discussion.

Nor is this article suggesting that former members of the Israel Defense Forces should automatically be refused entry to New Zealand.

In my view, that would be inconsistent with the way New Zealand’s immigration system is intended to operate.

The more interesting question is a different one.

If Immigration New Zealand already has a policy requiring enhanced character assessment for applicants associated with military organisations implicated in war crimes or gross human rights abuses, should that existing framework now be considered in relation to former members of the Israel Defense Forces?

During my years practising immigration law, I have seen these provisions applied in a number of contexts involving allegations of international crimes or serious human rights abuses. Those cases have included former Cambodian military personnel alleged to have participated in atrocities committed during the Khmer Rouge period, as well as members of the Pakistani military whose service gave rise to allegations of involvement in the torture of Taliban detainees. In each case, Immigration New Zealand did not proceed on the basis of nationality or military service alone. Rather, it undertook an individual assessment of the applicant’s own role, responsibilities and level of involvement. 

That experience has reinforced my view that New Zealand already possesses an immigration framework capable of addressing these issues through careful, evidence-based assessment of individual applicants.

That is ultimately a question of consistency.

Military service alone proves nothing. Israel has compulsory military service, and many people who have served in the IDF will have had no involvement whatsoever in conduct that could engage New Zealand’s character provisions. Immigration decisions should continue to be based on individual responsibility, not collective guilt. Indeed, that is exactly what Immigration Instruction A5.30 requires.

At the same time, New Zealand’s immigration framework also recognises that, in some circumstances, an applicant’s previous military service may justify further inquiry. The purpose of that inquiry is not to punish military service itself. It is to ensure that New Zealand’s immigration system protects the country’s international reputation while remaining fair to each individual applicant.

The issue, therefore, is not whether New Zealand should create a new character policy.

It already has one.

The question is whether recent international developments mean that the existing policy should now be considered in circumstances where it may previously not have been.

Reasonable people will no doubt reach different conclusions.

Some will argue that the existing framework is already sufficient. Others may conclude that Immigration New Zealand should review its operational guidance to ensure that the same principles are applied consistently whenever comparable international concerns arise.

Whatever one’s view, this is a legitimate policy question. It deserves careful discussion, based on evidence and existing legal principles, rather than assumptions about nationality or collective responsibility.